We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Moreover, we study how the auction format a¤ects the incentives for explicit or tacit collusion among incumbents. A crucial role is played by the relation between the number of incumbents and the number of licenses. If the number of incumbents is greater than the number of new licenses, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in greater competitiveness If the number of licenses exceeds the number of incumbents, we display plausible conditions under which all incumbents get a license. Finally, we suggest a positive role for some auction formats in which the number of licenses is endogenously determined at the auction. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from European license auctions for 3G mobile telephony.
Introduction
Telecommunication, public transportation, electricity, water and gas were traditionally provided by (often monopolistic) state …rms. It is now widely believed that recent technological advances have undermined the "natural monopoly" argument which has been often advanced in defense of such market structures 1 . During the last two decades several industries have been radically transformed by the introduction of competition 2 . The liberalization was implemented in di¤erent ways, according to region and industry. In the telecommunication industry competition was created by licensing several private …rms. There are, a priori, many ways to allocate licenses. For example, the allocation of …rst generation licenses for mobile telephony was made through lottery or through bureaucratic processes (so called "beauty contests"). Given that resale markets for licenses do not function well and are often subject to bureaucratic controls, and given that potential acquirers of licenses are better informed than regulators, it soon became clear that such methods lead to suboptimal allocations of licenses and that they do not generate substantial revenues. Further allocations of licenses were made through auctions (see McMillan, 1994 and McMillan, 1996 for accounts of the US experience, and Klemperer, 2000 for the UK).
The main goal of most spectrum license auctions is economic e¢ciency, which implies that some weighted sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses should be maximized. Although it is invariably less advertised, revenue is also an important part of the agency's objective function because governments tend to prefer solutions that require less subsidies (or even provide budgetary surpluses).
The di¢culty in achieving e¢ciency is due to the fact that consumers do not directly participate at spectrum auctions 3 . Moreover, ex-ante estimates of expected consumers' surplus in future market scenarios are di¢cult to make. Therefore, consumers' surplus does not play a natural role in shaping the auction's outcome, unless a regulatory agency provides a design that explicitly takes it into account. Since standard oligopoly models predict that in reasonable ranges both consumers' surplus and overall e¢ciency increase with increased competition among …rms, the creation of su¢cient market competition becomes a proxy goal that can be more potential new entrant. The German design was more, since it allowed outcomes with 4, 5 or 6 licenses. Besides an endogenous number of licenses, the design also allowed for endogenous capacity endowments 7 . This is its main weakness, since, in principle, it allows incumbents to completely preempt entry by bidding for additional capacity. In a companion paper (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000) we analyze this speci…c design in more detail. The German auction attracted 3 potential new entrants.
It is interesting to note that, in all auctions mentioned above, all respective incumbents got licenses. While there was no entry in Holland, an entrant (unavoidably) bought the reserved license in the UK. There were two new entries in Germany, but the process by which the outcome was reacheed is amusing: after the stage where 6 …rms were left in the auction (which equaled the maximal possible number of licenses and meant that the auction could end) and an aggregate bid of DM 63 billion, the incumbents continued to try to acquire additional capacity and hence, simultaneously, to reduce the number of available licenses. Faced with determined entrants and nervous investors, they ultimately gave up without any change in the physical outcome. But all …rms were another DM 35 billion poorer ! It is instructive to recall here also the result of the October 1999 German auction of capacity to the 4 GSM incumbents. The auction covered 10 duplex packages 8 . T-Mobil and Mannesmann, the …rst mobile operators in Germany, are much larger than two later entrants. Besides a need for additional capacity in congested areas, the large players were most likely driven by a preemptive motive. The auction was conducted in a simultaneous ascending format and proceeded as follows: After the …rst round, the high bidder on all 10 packages was Mannesmann, which o¤ered DM 36.360.000 for each of the packages 1-5, DM 40.000.000 for each of the packages 6-9 (which, recall, are identical to packages 1-5), and DM 56.000.000 for the larger package 10. In the second round, T-Mobil bid 9 DM 40.010.000 on packages 1-5, and the auction closed. Here is what one of T-Mobil's managers said: "No, there were no agreements with Mannesmann. But Mannesmann's …rst bid was a clear o¤er. Given Game Theory, it was expected that they show what they want most." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 7 Bids were made on 12 spectrum packages. A …rm must acquire at least two packages in order to be licensed, but can acquire up to three packages. 8 The …rst nine packages were identical, consisting of 2 £ 1 MHz, and the tenth consisted of 2 £ 1:4 MHz. 9 Minimum increments had to be 10% of the last high bid.
4 29, 1999, p.13) In this paper we consider a situation in which several incumbents are already present in the market. A regulatory agency sells one or more licenses. It can determine the number of auctioned licenses and some features of the auction format. Potential acquirers of new licenses include the incumbents 10 and entrants who are not yet present in the market. The downstream competition among licensed …rms is modeled via a reduced-form industry pro…t function. This modeling approach implies that values for licenses are endogenous, and depend on the …nal number of licensed …rms 11 . For simplicity, but also in order to isolate the e¤ect of market structure considerations, we assume that there are no informational asymmetries among the potential acquirers.
We focus on two objectives for the regulatory agency: the degree of competitiveness in the industry and the revenue generated by the auction. The degree of competitiveness is measured by the number of licensed …rms after the auction (that is, the number of incumbents augmented by the number of entrants who acquire a license) 12 . The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the underlying IO model. In Section 3 we analyze a one-license auction with n incumbents, and the incumbents' incentives to collude. In Section 4 we study auctions for several licenses (with possible supply uncertainty). We also study an auction in which the number of licenses is endogenously determined by the bid structure. Concluding comments are gathered in Section 5. 10 Incumbents may possibly "hide" their identity behind a new name if they are legally not allowed to acquire a new license . 11 The e¤ect of entry on pro…ts are well-documented. Consider the following quotations: "The arrival of four new PCS carriers in some US cities -breaking up the old cellular duopolies that had existed before -has driven down prices, one of the factors behind the growth in new subscribers" (Financial Times, Friday February 5, 1999) "Israeli Cable …rms complained that the approval of direct broadcast satellite television (DBS) was an unfair infringement on their monopoly. The High Court of Justice dismissed the petition, but ordered the government to negotiate some kind of compensation. Under a recent deal, the cable companies will receive permission to embark in a new …eld of operation -domestic communications in exchange for giving up their exclusive rights to most television channels and agreeing to share programming with DBS operators." (Haaretz, Tuesday, February 9, 1999) . 12 As mentioned above, the positive correlation between competitiveness and consumers' surplus can be made speci…c by adding extra structure about aggregate demand. But that extra structure is rarely accessible to the regulatory agency at the time of the auction, and the public debate often revolves around the degree of competitiveness that the auction induces.
Our main insights are as follows. Suppose that incumbents currently earn large pro…ts, that old and new licenses are close substitutes, and that the addition of one licensed entrant causes a signi…cant drop in per-…rm pro…t in the industry 13 . Then bidding among incumbents displays "war of attrition" features: since entry preemption has a public good aspect, incumbents are willing to buy new (even "worthless") licenses or capacity in order to avoid entry, while, at the same time, preferring that the cost of preemption is born by others.
If only one license is auctioned, the war of attrition leads to entry with positive probability. In this case we also show that the incentives for explicit collusion are highest when the expected bene…t for entrants is approximately equal to the di¤erence between the incumbents' post-and pre-entry pro…ts.
The war of attrition between incumbents can be alleviated if several licenses are auctioned, resulting in less entry. The point is that, with more licenses, the cost of preemption can be more easily shared among incumbents (even though the cost is higher). If the number of licenses equates the number of incumbents, each of them can purchase one license. This completely preempts entry, and the cost is equally shared among incumbents. Recall that this was the outcome of the Dutch 3G auction.
The above insight suggests that auctioning the maximum possible number of licenses need not induce a higher degree of competitiveness. Restricting supply is a way to combat tacit collusion and to induce more entry. Another way to combat tacit collusion is to use sequential auctions with some supply uncertainty about the number of future licenses 14 . In some cases, this format induces more entry than supply restriction.
If the number of licenses exceeds the number of incumbents, we display plausible conditions under which all incumbents get a license. This result …ts the outcome of the German and UK 3G license auctions.
Our analysis points out that the induced entry and revenue obtained in various auction formats crucially depends on the relation between the number of incumbents and the number of auctioned licenses. We also note that competitiveness and revenue may be both positively or negatively correlated, depending on the parameters of the model. Finally, we brie ‡y review an auction format proposed by GTE (in the universal service context) in which the winners of the auction are those bidders who have submitted bids in a given range below the highest bid (say 15% within the highest bid). Thus, the number of new licenses is endogenously determined by the bid structure. Such auction formats may prevent the incumbents from achieving a totally collusive agreement, and we suggest that they can perform better than a systematic supply restriction of new licenses. On the other hand, the endogenization of the number of licenses must be carefully done in order to avoid designs such as the German one discussed above.
Related literature
The analysis performed here is related to models considered in the literature on patent licensing, pioneered in Arrow (1962) (see the survey of . Gilbert and Newbery (1982) use an auction model to study the interaction between a monopolist incumbent and a potential entrant competing for an innovation. Their main result is the persistence of the monopolist which takes into account the potential negative externality and uses preemptive patenting. Krishna (1993 Krishna ( , 1999 and Gale and Stegeman (2000) study sequential auctions of inputs and show that monopoly may not persist in that context. Rodriguez (1997) studies sequential license auctions in a model with incumbents and entrants. He imposes conditions on the reduced-form downstream pro…t functions which directly induce sure entry at each auction (unless the initial market structure is monopolistic, in which case the Gilbert-Newbery result applies). McAfee (1998) studies capacity auctions in oligopolies where some …rms are capacity constrained, and points out the resulting externalities. He shows that unconstrained …rms may win the auction in some cases. Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Kamien, Tauman and Oren (1992) and Shapiro (1985, 1986) study patent licensing in oligopolistic downstream industries and speci…cally point out the presence of allocative externalities among …rms. These authors assume that all …rms are ex-ante symmetric 15 -this is the key di¤erence between theirs and our work. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996a) allow for ex-ante asymmetries among the downstream competing …rms and focus on the incentives to participate in an auction for a cost-reducing innovation protected by a patent. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1997 ) and Jehiel et. al. (1996b look at models where one object is auctioned and where agents possess private information about imposed or incurred externalities. The focus in the last two papers is on mechanism design and on revenue maximizing sales procedures 16 . Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) provides a detailed study and critique of the special German design for the 3G license auction.
The free-riding phenomenon among incumbents is connected to the positive externality identi…ed in the literature on mergers (see Perry and Porter 1985 , McAfee and Williams 1988 , Farrell and Shapiro 1990 . However, this literature does not discuss the resulting war of attrition. For an analysis of such a war of attrition in a bargaining context, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a,b) . The possibility of collusive-like outcomes in auctions for several objects has been studied by Wilson (1979) and Anton and Yao (1992) , and more recently by Ausubel and Schwarz (1999) , Brusco and Lopomo (1999) , and Klemperer (2000) . Papers that focus on informational asymmetries in market design are Auriol and Laffont (1992) , Dana and Spier (1994) , McGuire and Riordan (1995), and Milgrom (1996) . Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) o¤er a general (and abstract) perspective on e¢cient multi-object auctions with allocational and informational externalities.
The Model
We consider an industry with n incumbents. New …rms can enter the market by acquiring licenses from a regulatory agency. We assume that there are m potential entrants.
The regulatory agency organizes an auction for new licenses. New licenses may di¤er in speci…cation from the licenses owned by incumbents. Our model allows for various forms of substitutability/complementarity between old and new licenses.
In each feasible con…guration, we assume that …rms' pro…ts solely depend on the number of active …rms after the auction. That is, suppose k licenses are auctioned and suppose s · k entrants acquire a license (and thus k ¡s incumbents acquire a new license). Then the number of active …rms after the auction is n + s, and all payo¤s depend on n + s as follows:
1. An unsuccessful entrant receives a payo¤ of zero.
A successful entrant receives a payo¤ of w e (n + s).
3. An unsuccessful incumbent receives a payo¤ of ¼(n + s).
A successful incumbent receives a payo¤ of w i (n + s).
We assume that the pro…t functions ¼; w e , w i are decreasing in their arguments. We also assume that 8t; w i (t)¸¼(t), and w e (t)¸0: We denote v(t)´w i (t)¡ ¼(t). All pro…t functions are assumed to be common knowledge among bidders. The status quo corresponds to the case k = 0.
It is convenient to denote
and
. The parameter d will be called the market structure parameter , whereas g will be called the direct bene…t parameter.
The above setup is su¢ciently general to cover many applications of interest. For example, if new and old licenses are perfect substitutes, then ¼´w e´wi and v´0. If they are imperfect substitutes and a new license is more valuable to incumbents than an old one, then v > 0. If entrants have to incur a …xed cost c to catch up the incumbents' advantage, but old and new licenses are otherwise perfect substitutes, then ¼´w i and w e´¼ ¡ c , and so on 17 ... In some applications we extend the model and allow the payo¤ functions w e and v to depend also on the number of new licenses k (besides the dependence on the number of active …rms). These functions will be then denoted by w k e (n + s) and v k (n + s), respectively. Such an extension is needed if the pro…t induced by the new license has some component which depends on the speci…c market structure associated with the new license market 18 . Incumbents on the one hand, and entrants on the other are assumed to be symmetric. This is to highlight the e¤ect of the asymmetry between incumbents and entrants (rather than the asymmetry within a given group). Throughout the paper, we focus on equilibria where symmetric bidders use symmetric strategies, and where bidders do not use (weakly) dominated strategies. 19 To ensure the existence of equilibria in our complete information models we need tie-breaking assumptions: these are tailored to the speci…c auctions (an equivalent alternative 17 The model also covers the case (which is less interesting from the viewpoint of this paper) in which the activities of the two licenses are completely independent. This corresponds to ¼ being constant. 18 For example, consider the markets for 3G and 2G mobile telephony. 19 Equilibrium considerations would automatically yield the restriction to (weakly) undominated strategies if some private information perturbation, say on valuations, were introduced.
is to introduce a smallest money unit). Basically, the tie-breaking rules say that incumbents are treated symmetrically, and that high bidding entrants cannot get licenses as long as there are unserved incumbents willing to make bids at least as high.
Auctions for one license
In this Section we assume that there is one license for sale, i.e. k = 1. The license is sold through a Vickrey or sealed-bid second price auction 20 . All bidders simultaneously submit bids, which are non-negative real numbers. The bidder with highest bid gets the license and pays the second highest bid for it.
The main thing to note is the fundamental di¤erence between incumbents and potential entrants with respect to the nature of their willingness to pay: If an entrant acquires the license at a price p · w e (n + 1), then it expects an increase in payo¤ from zero to w e (n+1)¡p; whereas the incumbents experience a decrease of payo¤ from ¼(n) to ¼(n + 1): If an incumbent acquires the license at a price p, then he experiences a change in payo¤ from ¼(n) to ¼(n) + v(n) ¡ p; and all other incumbents receive ¼(n). Hence, an entrant is prepared to pay up to w e (n + 1) for a license, and an incumbent is prepared to pay up to ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n) or v(n) , depending on whether he expects an entrant or another incumbent to acquire the license instead. The outcome of the auction will vary, depending on the relation between w e (n+1); ¼(n) ¡¼(n +1)+v(n); and v(n): There are several cases of interest:
1. Assume that d+g < 1 (i.e., ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n) < w e (n+1)) In this case, an entrant's expected payo¤ w e (n + 1) is higher than the maximum willingness to pay of an incumbent3. Assume that g < 1 < d + g: In this case the entrants' willingness to pay w e (n + 1) is less than the incumbents' willingness to pay for preemptive motives, i.e. ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n), but more than the incumbents' willingness to pay for direct motives, i.e. v(n). If there is only one incumbent, then his willingness to pay is unambiguously de…ned by ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n), and the incumbent acquires the license with probability one
22 . An interesting phenomenon occurs when there are n > 1 incumbents. A bidding "war of attrition" takes place among the incumbents, since their bids must balance two con ‡icting interests: on the one side they wish to pre-empt entry, but on the other side they wish to let some other incumbent pay the price of preemption.
In order to ensure equilibrium existence we use the following tie-breaking rule: an entrant with a highest bid cannot win the license if there exists at least an incumbent that has made the same highest bid 23 . Moreover, if s incumbents tie at the highest bid, then each wins the license with probability 1 s : Proposition 3.1. Assume that k = 1, and that there are n > 1 incumbents.
. The payo¤s of entrants and incumbents are uniquely de…ned in a symmetric equilibrium. Each entrant bids w e (n + 1). Each incumbent bids w e (n + 1) with probability q(±; n); and bids 0 (or below w e (n + 1)) with probability 1 ¡ q(±; n), where q = q(±; n) is implicitly de…ned by
A potential entrant gets the license with probability x(±; n) = (1 ¡ q(±; n)) n ; and has a zero expected pro…t. An incumbent's expected pro…t is given by:
Proof. See Appendix. The equilibrium entry probability x(±; n) is entirely determined by the number n of incumbents and the parameter ± = d 1¡g , which aggregates the market structure and the direct bene…t parameters. We have: Proposition 3.2. Assume that g < 1 < d + g: In the one-license auction, the probability of entry x(±; n) is a decreasing function of ± and an increasing function of n.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is relatively intuitive that the probability of entry decreases in d and in g (and thus in ±): for larger d, the incumbents are more willing to avoid entry, and for larger g, the net cost of acquiring a license for an incumbent is smaller. It is less straightforward to see that this probability decreases in n : on the one hand, the free riding problem among incumbents becomes more severe as n increases, which induces a higher probability of entry; on the other hand, for a given strategy of incumbents, the probability that all n incumbents bid zero (and hence that an entrant wins the license) is decreasing in n . Proposition 3.2 shows that the …rst e¤ect is dominant.
The next Proposition establishes the overall behavior of the equilibrium entry probability as a function of the number of incumbents n.
decreases in n. Then the probability of entry x(±(n); n) is a non-decreasing function of n .
Proof. We need to show x(±(n + 1); n + 1)¸x(±(n); n). There are several cases to consider:
1. If ±(n) · 1 then ±(n + 1) · 1: In this case there is sure entry (whether there are n or n + 1 incumbents) and x(±(n + 1); n + 1) = x(±(n); n).
2. If ±(n + 1) · 1 < ±(n) then there is sure entry with n + 1 incumbents, but not with n incumbents, so that x(±(n + 1); n + 1) = 1¸x(±(n); n).
3. If ±(n)¸±(n + 1)¸1;we obtain by Proposition 3.2:
x(±(n + 1); n + 1)¸x(±(n); n + 1)¸x(±(n); n):
Whether or not the function
is decreasing depends on the speci…c IO context. For example, in the case of perfect substitutability where g = 0 and w e = ¼; the monotonicity of ±(n) reduces to the requirement that
is decreasing, which is satis…ed in many oligopoly models.
We conclude this subsection by presenting explicit formulae for n = 2 and n = 3. ; and the probability of entry is given by
. The probabilities of entry as a function of ± are depicted in the following …gure.
Insert Figure 1 here 
Explicit collusion among incumbents
In this subsection we consider the possibility of explicit collusion 24 among incumbents. We wish to compare the highest collusive payo¤ incumbents could achieve (using any kind of mechanism) to the payo¤ they obtain in the non-collusive bidding analyzed above 25 . Let ¢ C be the per-…rm pro…t of incumbents under perfect collusion and let ¢ NC be the pro…t of incumbent …rms in the above symmetric equilibrium outcome. The entrants' willingness to pay is invariably w e (n+1): Note that when incumbents collude, the price paid for the license is always w e (n + 1); since the absence of competition between incumbents drives down the price to entrants' willingness to pay of entrants.
We wish to compare the di¤erence ¢ C ¡ ¢ NC to w e (n + 1), and we denote
The higher this ratio, the higher the incumbents' incentive to collude. There are several cases of interest:
. In this case, collusion among incumbents takes the standard form of avoiding wasteful competition. 24 By explicit collusion, we mean a situation where incumbents can fully agree on their bidding behavior at the auction, and can make any kind of transfers between themselves, possibly outside the auction. 25 Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) study collusion in simpler IO setup, but with asymmetric information among bidders. They show how market structure considerations may complicate the information sharing among colluding bidders.
2. If g < 1, the main incumbents' motive for acquiring the license is to preempt entry. The cost of preemption is determined by the entrants' willingness to pay, i.e. w e (n + 1). Preemption is thus desirable for the incumbents' ring whenever n¼(n) + v(n)¡ w e (n + 1) > n¼(n + 1), that is, whenever
, entry occurs for sure and we have ¢ C = ¼(n + 1). This yields for g < 1:
small enough, collusion is not bene…cial for the incumbents: in the non-cooperative equilibrium, an entrant gets the license and there is no point to avoid that entry even when taking into account the pro…t loss incurred by every incumbent. For
< 1, there is some bene…t of collusion: In the non-cooperative outcome there is sure entry, because the cost to an individual incumbent does not justify preemption; however, taking into account the loss of every incumbent it is worth preempting entry. For is very large because, despite the war of attrition, an entrant very rarely gets the license in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This suggests that we should expect more collusion among incumbents when the market structure parameter is neither too low nor too large.
Example 3.5. For illustrative purposes, consider the explicit formulae for n = 2; 3 and g = 0:
for n = 2 and 26 To see this, recall expression 3.1 and note that q tends to 1 when ± tends to in…nity. Then, plug the expression of ± to show that ±(1 ¡ q) n¡1 tends to 
for n = 3
The following …gure plots the relative bene…t of collusion as a function of d and reveals that this bene…t is maximal at d = 1:
Insert Figure 2 here.
Multi-License Auctions
In this Section we analyze the e¤ect of auctioning several licenses. We consider the Vickrey auction (which extends here the sealed-bid second-price auction used for k = 1): each bidder i submits a bid b i ; the bidders with the k highest bids get a license each and pay the (k + 1) highest bid. That is, rearranging the bids in increasing order, b i(1)¸¢ ¢ ¢¸b i(k)¸bi(k+1)¸¢ ¢ ¢, every bidder i(1), ¢ ¢ ¢; i(k) gets a license and pays b i(k+1) 27 . The simultaneous ascending price version (where the price gradually increases until there are k remaining bidders who each obtains a license and pays the current price) yields here the same results 28 .
When all incumbents get licensed
In the British UMTS auction there were 5 licenses, one more than the number of GSM incumbents. All 4 incumbents obtained a new license. In light of our model this is not surprising since, besides expecting a higher direct bene…t (due to lower infrastructure costs), incumbents are also driven by preemption motives. The following Proposition makes this observation precise.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that k > n and that ¼(k)¡¼(k +1)+v(k) > w e (k). A symmetric equilibrium of the k¡license auction is as follows: entrants bid w e (k); and incumbents bid above that (say ¼(k) ¡ ¼(k + 1) + v(k)). All incumbents get a license, and k ¡ n entrants get a license. All licenses are sold, and the revenue is given by kw e (k).
Proof. If the above strategy pro…le is played, entrants get a payo¤ of zero, and incumbents get a payo¤ of w i (k) ¡ w e (k) = v(k) + ¼(k) ¡ w e (k). The above strategies form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that all other …rms bid at least w e (k) and given that all licenses are sold, incumbent i has no incentive to bid below that since this would give him a payo¤ of
Given that an entrant expects that n out of k licenses will be sold to incumbents, the value of a license to an entrant is w e (k). Two cases must be qualitatively distinguished in the interpretation of Proposition 4.1. If v(k) > w e (k), incumbents intrinsically value the license more than entrants, and therefore it is legitimate that they are served …rst. But they continue to be licensed with probability 1 even if v(k) < w e (k), as long as
. This corresponds to the preemptive motive.
Suppose now that the number of auctioned licenses k coincides with the number of incumbents n. This was the Dutch case (5 licenses, 5 incumbents) where no entry occured.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n) > w e (n+1).
The following strategies de…ne an equilibrium of the Vickrey auction with k = n licenses: Incumbents bid above w e (n + 1), say ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n). Entrants bid w e (n + 1). The incumbents acquire one license each at price w e (n + 1). There is no entry and total revenue is nw e (n + 1).
Proof. The above strategies form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that incumbent i bids above w e (n + 1), incumbent i 0 has no incentive to bid below w e (n + 1): Incumbent i 0 would then leave one license to an entrant, and his resulting payo¤ would be ¼(n + 1) < ¼(n) + v(n) ¡ w e (n + 1) ; 2) Given that an entrant expects that all other licenses go to incumbents, the value of a license to an entrant is w e (n + 1).
As in the case k > n, two scenarios must be qualitatively distinguished in the above Proposition according to how g(n) compares to 1. If g(n) > 1, the direct bene…t for the new license is superior for incumbents than for entrants, and therefore it is legitimate that incumbents acquire a license.
If g(n) < 1, entrants intrinsically value the new license more than incumbents do. However, when d(n) +g(n) > 1, incumbents are willing to acquire one license each, so that no entrant can get in this market. It is interesting to compare this result with the one derived under the same conditions in the one-license auction: there, an entrant had a positive probability of getting a license due to the war of attrition between the incumbents. When k = n licenses are auctioned, there is an easy way to share the price of preemption: each incumbent buys one license, and the war of attrition disappears, leading to prefect preemption. Restricting attention to the equilibria displayed in Propositions 3.1 and 4.2, we get:
. The expected number of entries when one license is auctioned is higher than the expected number of entries when k = n licenses are auctioned.
Remark: Proposition 4.2 has displayed one equilibrium of the n-license Vickrey auction, but sometimes several equilibria exist. To illustrate the point, assume that there are n = 2 incumbents, and that 2 licenses are sold. If d(3) + g(3) > 1, the above equilibrium outcome is the unique outcome of symmetric equilibria in undominated strategies. If d(3) + g(3) < 1, there is another symmetric equilibrium that induces a very di¤erent outcome: entrants bid w e (4); and incumbents bid below w e (4). Hence two entrants get new licenses at price w e (4).
The multiplicity in the case d(3) +g(3) < 1 < d(2) + g (2) is caused, essentially, by a coordination problem among incumbents. If incumbent 1 expects incumbent 2 to make a low bid, the question is whether there will eventually be 3 or 4 active …rms in the industry. Since d(3) + g(3) < 1, incumbent 1 is also not willing to acquire a license. If incumbent 1 expects incumbent 2 to make a high bid, the question is whether there will eventually be 2 or 3 active …rms, and incumbent 1 is then willing to acquire a new license (since d(2) + g(2) > 1).
From the point of view of incumbents 29 , the full preemption equilibrium Paretodominates the full entry equilibrium. The risk-dominance analysis is complicated due to the fact that the entrants use di¤erent strategies in each equilibrium. A simple case in which this di¢culty does not arise is the one where w e (3) = w e (4) and g(3) = g(4) = 0. Then entrants have a (weakly) dominant strategy: bid w e (3) = w e (4). In a Vickrey auction where incumbents are restricted to make a bid below w e (3) or a bid above w e (3), we can apply the standard de…nition of risk-dominance (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) and we …nd that the full preemption equilibrium risk-dominates the full entry equilibrium whenever d(2) > 2:
30
In our discussion we will mostly focus on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. 29 Entrants get 0 anyway.
Supply restriction
Corollary 4.3 shows that an auction for one license may induce more entry than an auction for n licenses when d(n)+g(n) > 1, g(n) < 1 and the functions v and w e do not depend on k . If the primary concern is to induce more competitiveness, and at most n licenses can be auctioned, 31 then restricting the number of auctioned licenses may be desirable. Note that revenue is undoubtedly higher in the n-license auction (where it is equal to nw e (n + 1)) than in the one-license auction (where it is equal to w e (n + 1)). Hence the tension between competitiveness and revenue is acute. The rest of this subsection considers several forms of supply restriction, and also considers the case where more than n licenses can be auctioned.
Optimal deterministic supply restriction
Given the above general observation, it makes sense to ask what is the optimal number of licenses from the point of view of inducing entry. This turns out to be a di¢cult question even in the perfect information setting considered here. The main di¢culty is that whenever d(n) + g(n) > 1 and g(n) < 1, the k-license auction with k < n has the structure of a war of attrition with k objects, and it is very hard to compare the probabilities of entries for the various k, k < n.
We provide a partial answer to the above question in a setting where the bene…t functions v k and w k e depend on the number k of auctioned licenses. We let d k , g k be the corresponding market structure and direct bene…t parameters 32 .
Proposition 4.4. Fix k < n; and assume that d n (n) + g n (n) > 1 and that g k (n) < 1 if and only if k¸k . Assume also that there are at most k = n licenses. Then the expected number of entries is maximized for k 0 2 [k; n ¡ 1]:
Proof. We have g k (n) > 1 for k < k. Thus if k < k licenses are auctioned, incumbents acquire all of them, and there is no entry. By Proposition 4.2, there is no entry either if k = n licenses are auctioned. If k licenses are auctioned, there is entry with positive probability whether or not
It is more likely that g k (n) is a decreasing function of k, since bene…ts associated with the new licenses are probably larger when fewer new licenses are available. The assumption on g k (n) is then plausible.
Proposition 4.4 shows that a transition from k = n to k < n may be bene…cial for competitiveness . But what about situations in which more than n licenses can be auctioned? Obviously, if 2n ¡ 1 or more licenses are auctioned, at least n ¡ 1 entrants will acquire a license, and there is no way to induce a higher competitiveness by auctioning k < n licenses.
Assume then that at most k < 2n ¡ 1 licenses can be auctioned. The following Proposition identi…es simple circumstances under which, in case k < n; more entry is expected than in the cases where k 2 [n; 2n ¡ 2].
Proposition 4.5. Assume that for all k, w e (k) = w e , v(k) = v, ¼(k) ¡ ¼(k + 1) = ¢¼ > 0 and that ¢¼+v we = 1 + " > 1. Then, if " is small enough, for all k 2 [0; 2n ¡ 2] ; the expected number of entries is maximized when n ¡ 1 licenses are auctioned.
Proof. If k¸n licenses are auctioned, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show that all incumbents get licensed. Hence, the number of entries is 0
If k < n licenses are auctioned, there is a war of attrition phenomenon. Entrants bid w e ; and incumbents use a mixed strategy 33 : bid w e with probability q; and bid 0 with probability 1 ¡ q. In equilibrium an incumbent has to be indi¤erent between bidding 0 and bidding w e . Bidding w e is e¤ective and hence advantageous relatively to a bid of 0 only if at most k ¡ 1 other incumbents bid w e . The net gain provided by such a bid is ¢¼ + v ¡ w e = "w e : If k or more incumbents bid w e ; such a bid has a cost of at least k n (w e ¡ v) > 0 34 . As " goes to 0, the probability q must also converge to 0 (so that the indi¤erence condition continues to hold). When q is close to 0, there are approximately k entries on expectation, hence the number of entries is maximized by setting k = n ¡ 1.
The intuition for Proposition 4.5 is as follows. Given that ¢¼ +v > w e , Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 guarantee that if k¸n licenses are auctioned all incumbents get a license. Thus, if k¸n the number of entries is increasing in k: If k < n licenses are auctioned, the condition ¢¼+v we = 1 + " implies that v < w e for " small enough. Thus, we are in the war of attrition regime in which the incumbent's intrinsic value for the new license is lower than that of entrants, but the preemption value is higher. The outcome of this war of attrition depends on the magnitude of ¢¼ + v ¡ w e . When ¢¼ + v ¡ w e is small, the surplus to be gained by preemption is small, and therefore incumbents do not bid above w e with a high probability. This results in almost k entries, and Proposition 4.5 follows.
The conditions displayed in Proposition 4.5 are obviously restrictive 35 . However, Proposition 4.5 clearly shows that auctioning less licenses may induce more entry. The main reason is that preemption takes the strategic form of tacit collusion if k¸n and the form of an war of attrition if k < n.
Random Supply
Another way to restrict supply is to have a random number of licenses. We illustrate the potential bene…t of random supply in an example with two incumbents: one license is auctioned …rst (through a sealed bid second price auction), and then a second license is auctioned with probability u 36 . The probability u is common knowledge. Note that u = 0 corresponds to the one-license auction studied in Section 3 and that u = 1 corresponds to a deterministic sequential two-license auction (which leads here to the same insights as the simultaneous two-license Vickrey auction).
The following example exhibits a setting where the random supply auction induces more entry than both a one-license and a two-license auction. < 1: In the Appendix we show that there is a unique symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. The expected number of entries is N = (1 ¡ r(u)) 2 (1 + u); where
); the expected number of entries N is maximal for an interior probability u ¤ , 0 < u ¤ < 1: (See Appendix.) The expected revenue is given by R = (1 + u)¼(3), which is an increasing function of u; so that it is maximized at u = 1. 35 The independence with respect to k is unlikely to be satis…ed in most cases. 36 Consider the following quotation from the UK's Radiocommunications Agency information brochure about UMTS licenses: " It (the Government) will press in the international bodies for more spectrum to be allocated, but the timing of extra spectrum being available is very uncertain...there can be no guarantee that there will be an additional operator licensed in the future."
Insert Figure 3 here
Increasing u has two e¤ects on the entry probability: on the one hand, if an entrant acquires the …rst license, it increases the probability that a second entrant gets a license 37 (direct e¤ect); on the other hand, it reduces the intensity of the war of attrition on the …rst license (since r(u) is an increasing function of u), which implies that the probability that an entrant gets the …rst license is a decreasing function of u. The optimal probability u has to balance these two e¤ects.
Endogenous license supply
In all auction formats analyzed above, the number of licenses did not depend on bidders' behavior at the auction. We now consider an auction format in which the number of licenses is endogenously determined by the bid structure 38 . Speci…cally, consider the following auction format (inspired by a proposal submitted by GTE). All bidders simultaneously submit bids. Let b max be the highest bid. All bidders i who have submitted a bid b i in the interval [(1 ¡ h)b max ; b max ] get a license. The number of winning bidders is thus endogenously determined. The scalar h 2 [0; 1] is set exogenously, and is part of the description of the auction format. Suppose there are k winners. Then each winning bidder must pay a price equal to the (k + 1)-highest bid, that is, b (k+1) . In the following Proposition, we assume that w e is a constant, i.e., independent of the number of active …rms. We also denote g = . Proposition 4.7. Assume that there are n > 1 incumbents and m¸1 entrants. Assume that g < 1 and d m + g < 1. The following bidding strategies constitute a symmetric Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies 39 : entrants bid w e ; each incumbent bids b > we 1¡h with probability q GT E , and bids 0 with probability 1 ¡ q GT E ; where
37 One could argue that there is no competitive value of having 4 rather than 3 active …rms (since ¼(3) = ¼(4)). However, a similar insight holds if (4) ¼(4) < 1 . In such a case there is a clear positive competitive e¤ect of having 4 active …rms. 38 Recall that this feature was also part of the German design for the UMTS license auctions. 39 In the special case where ¼(n + 1) = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ¼(n + m), this is the only symmetric equilibrium in undominated strategies.
Remark 1: Despite the fact that several licenses may be sold in equilibrium, the incumbents do not achieve a highly collusive agreement. The equilibrium bidding strategies still re ‡ect the war of attrition among incumbents, and this auction format induces more entry than the n-license Vickrey auction analyzed in Proposition 4.2. It is also interesting to compare the entry induced by this auction format with the entry induced when less than n licenses are auctioned. For illustrative purpose, we compare with the entry induced by the one-license auction.
There are two e¤ects which go in opposite direction. One the one hand, the endogenous format exacerbates the market structure parameter and therefore it may induce a lower entry probability . This comes form the observation that, for m > 1; d m is likely to be larger than d = d 1 . On the other hand, assuming that d m and d 1 are close to each other, the nature of the respective wars of attrition is such that the probability of entry is larger in the GTE auction. The point is that the cost of bidding high is greater in the GTE auction than it is in the one-license auction: In the GTE auction, when you bid high, you have to buy the license whereas in the one-license auction, sometimes you do not need to buy it if other incumbents have made a high bid as well. This in turn results in a lower probability that incumbents bid high in the GTE auction than in the one-license auction, and leads therefore to a larger entry probability.
Remark 2: In order to avoid the collusive equilibrium, it is important to keep h constant (i.e., independent of the number of winning bidders). If the auction format were such that, say, h was itself a decreasing function of the number of winning bidders, then tacit collusion could again be achieved 40 . To conclude this subsection, we note that the endogenous license auction may be suitable to combat tacit collusion among incumbents, and that it may sometimes perform better than an auction with supply restriction 41 .
Concluding Comments
We have analyzed the auction of new licenses in an oligopolistic industry. The focus was on the role of market structure considerations in determining the auction's outcome (in particular the number of licensed …rms, and the revenue obtained at the auction). An important observation is that the auction format determines the incumbents' possibilities to preempt new entry in the market. In this context, the relation between the number of new licenses and the number of incumbents plays a major role. Finally, we have compared several theoretical results to the results of several recent auctions of licenses in the telecommunication industry. Most of the auction-theoretic literature focuses on informational problems. In order to conduct a serious discussion about the merits of various auction designs in the context of recent privatization and licensing processes it is necessary to augment those "classical" models by incorporating market structure elements.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Bidding w e (n+1) is a dominant strategy for entrants, and we now focus on incumbents. For the suggested strategy to be optimal, it must be the case that each incumbent is indi¤erent between bidding zero and bidding ¼(n + 1):
Bidding zero yields an expected payo¤ of
Bidding w e (n + 1) yields an expected payo¤ of
Equating the expected payo¤s from the two bids yields the following:
Noting that
we 42 …nally obtain:
Then lim q!0 G(q) = 1 and lim q!1 G(q) = 1:
; we obtain that equation 6.2 has always a unique solution q ¤ 2 [0; 1]. An entrant gets the license only when all incumbents bid 0, hence the probability of entry is (1 ¡ q ¤ )
n Proof of Proposition 3.2: The equilibrium probability of entry x(±; n) is implicitly de…ned by
Let w(x; n) = 
which is equivalent to
Since 1 ¡ z + ln z < 0 for z 2 (0; 1), we obtain @w @n (x; n) > 0: (ii) @w @x (x; n) < 0 is equivalent (for y 2 (0; 1)) to
which is equivalent to ¡n(1 ¡ y) + 1 ¡ y n < 0:
This condition is easily checked 43 for y 2 (0; 1). Hence, @w @x (x; n) < 0.
42 To see this integrate (w.r.t. z) the following identity:
The function ¡n(1 ¡ y) + 1 ¡ y n is equal to zero at y = 1. Its derivative is positive for y < 1.
Example 4.6: It remains to analyze the incumbents' equilibrium strategies. Consider the second auction. If the …rst license has been acquired by an entrant bidder, incumbent bidders bid below ¼(3) and an entrant gets the second license at price ¼(3) (because d(3) = 0 < 1). If the …rst license has been acquired by incumbent 1, then incumbent 2 bids above ¼(3) (say ¼(2) ¡ ¼(3)) and he gets the second license at price ¼(3) (because d(2) > 1).
Consider now the …rst auction. As in Section 3, the symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Each incumbent bidder bids ¼(3) with probability r and 0 with probability 1 ¡ r. The probability r is computed so that an incumbent bidder is indi¤erent between bidding 0; which yields r(¼(2) ¡ ¼(3)) + (1 ¡ ru)¼ (3) and bidding ¼(3), which yields
Equating these two expressions yields:
The expressions for the expected number of entries and the expected revenue easily follow 44 . The result about revenue is immediate. For the expected number of entries, observe that N 0 (0) = ¡ 2d(2) ¡ 3 (2d(2) ¡ 1) 3 > 0; for d(2) 2 (1; 3 2 ) N 0 (1) = 0; and N 00 (1) = 1 (d ¡ 1) 2 > 0; for d(2) > 1 44 The probability that an entrant acquires the …rst license is (1 ¡ r) 2 . Whenever an entrant acquires the …rst license, there is sure entry on the second license when it takes place (which occurs with probability u).
Proof of Proposition 4.7: Entrants have a dominant strategy, to bid w e . Consider now an incumbent. Given the strategies of other bidders, a bid of 0 (or any other bid strictly lower than (1 ¡ h)b) yields: ) is dominated by a bid of b. Finally, a bid of b or higher yields:
The last expression follows because the incumbent bidder wins then a license, no entrant is licensed, and every winner pays the entrants' bid. The probability q GT E is obtained by equating expressions 6.3and 6.4. 
